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META: Water seems to be one important medium through which NOLA envisions the “impacts” of the Anthropocene—scarcity, abundance, temporalities and spatial distributions, management of, and hazards that emerge in its context. Less is said about the causal or attributional aspects of the Anthropocene. How might water function as an entry point into the assemblages of local anthropocenics?

I found the NOLA Hazard Mitigation Plan for 2018, which frames the impacts of the Anthropocene as an intersection of weather extremes amid climate change and evolving vulnerabilities of its people. Four of seven items in the executive summary note water as central to local interventions: flood awareness, flood repair, flood mitigation, flood infrastructure. Too much water or water in the wrong places and the aftereffect of water on infrastructure and lives. One expression, then, is preparedness.

MACRO: Mitigation is an interesting analytic for the Anthropocene. In the US mitigation plans are shaped by the 1988 Stafford Act (which amended the 1974 Disaster Relief Act). Constraints on communities come through rules, regulations, policies, (dis)incentives, and surveillance by state and federal authorities. Much of this is bound by economic and administrative discourses.

Goals are set in this document—broken out by timelines, activities, priorities, and capabilities. Another expression is classification of anthropocenics by subfields and accounting metrics. How do we measure progress and what is deferred to the future, 5-10 years out from today, a goal that has no tangible accountability but is named and acknowledged. What are the practices of naming, responsibility, and making (in)visible in the Anthropocene?

BIO: One new initiative, Ready for Rain, in particular is of interest to me as it highlights the more neoliberal vision for how the public should self-regulate risk and mitigate harm. I hear this as an extension of a government agency program to make the nation Weather Ready. Other bullets highlight “green” buildings, energies, and infrastructures. These could be examples of how the city envisions the Anthropocene feedback loop of humans changing/planning for climate alterations, which is a fairly typical lens.

Some questions: What does the water do? What does the water know? If we trace water in all its instantiations (e.g. historical water, flow of water, chemistry of water, application of water, temperature of water), what do we learn about the future imaginaries of what NOLA will / could / ought to become?

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

Resilience is a term that is widely embraced by many in city management and planning. It holds the positive gloss not just of recovery but bouncing back better. To my ears, it has become one of many anthems of the Anthropocene, a kind of restrained tempo thrumming along through communities that will adapt to climate change (or seasonal-to-subseasonal climate variability post Trump). They will mitigate, innovate, transform, strategize in order to endure unanticipated shocks, both chronic and acute.

NOLA is one of 100 Resilient Cities named by the Rockefeller Foundation sometime in 2013. Like others selected across the globe, the city of New Orleans would benefit from the resources of a Chief Resilience Officer (CRO), an expert in resilience to be hired to work within city governance to develop a strategic plan; NOLA's was published in 2015. Selection of the cities for the "100 Resilient Cities" initiative was difficult, a competitive bid for resources based primarily on a city's recent experience with disaster, usually connected to a weather or climate extreme (e.g. hurricane, flood, etc). Resources were provided via the hierarchy of the CRO, sometimes to hire staff, develop training for the community, and create working groups and to write the stratetic plan. As one former directer of NOLA RC said of this opportunity provided by Katrina, the disaster that qualified NOLA for Rockefeller monies, it demonstrates the need for an the age of resilience. In what ways is resilience measured, accounted for, adjudicated and managed through or in spite of this strategic document? 

The language of resilience includes many terms that I think of as a collective imaginary of utopian preparedness, a vision for a nation that is--in the parlance of the weather prediction community in which I work--weather ready. Through the filter of resilience, then, vulnerability (another problematic term) is eradicated through individual action, community engineering, and adherance to strategic policies like 100RC. Yet how does this image of NOLA, one of "mindful citizenry" engaged in "partnerships" around the city (terms used in their summary video), match with the realities of living in NOLA, today and in the everyday future?

Resilience is also a term widely critiqued in STS and the broader social science and humanistic disciplines. For good reason. Common questions in this literature: What counts as resilience? Who decides? At what costs? Resilience against what? What does resilience elide? How has the discourse of resilience reframed individual and community accountability? What is the political economy of resilience? I'm interested in the discourses of preparedness and planning, and "the eventness" of disaster, as Scott has highlighted many times. But my concern is not just to critique and tear down concepts like resilence (or vulnerability). I worry that we then evicerate common lexicons of hope and imaginaries of the future that do some good. How are we as field campus participants and those who re-envision or reveal the quotidian reflexive? How do we triage the Anthropocene amid our own state of compromise--as scholars, participants in Capitalism, in post colonialism, humans? What are our ethical commitments? How do we make good? 

This health registry relies heavily on collaborations and other organizations. There is actually an entire section of the website dedicated to listing all the organizations that collaborate and work together in order to provide this information for the registry. The registry is a collaborative effort between the US Department of Health and Human Services and NYC. 

There are 3 advisory groups that work with WTC health Registry, they are the Community Advisory Board, the Labor Advisory Board and the Scientific Advisory Board. The following organizations are also listed as organizations that this registry depends on for research, number and data:

Government

• National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
• Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

Scientific 

• Albert Einstein College of Medicine
• Boston University – School of Public Health
• City University of New York – Graduate School of Public Health and Health Policy
• City University of New York - Hunter College
• City University of New York - Queens College
• Columbia University - Mailman School of Public Health
• Columbia University – Medical Center
• Columbia University - New York Psychiatric Institute
• Cornell University
• Fire Department of New York City (FDNY) - Bureau of Health Services
• Fordham University
• HHC WTC Environmental Health Center at Bellevue Hospital Center
• Hospital for Special Surgery
• Johns Hopkins University - Bloomberg School of Public Health
• Mount Sinai Medical Center
• New School University
• New York City Police Department - Chief Surgeon's Office
• NYU Medical Center
• New York State Department of Health
• Rutgers University
• San Francisco State University
• State University of New York – Albany – School of Public Health
• State University of New York - Stonybrook
• State University of New York -Stonybrook University Medical Center
• University of California – San Francisco – School of Medicine
• University of Greenwich (United Kingdom)
• Weill Cornell Medicine

The main point of this article was to display the inner workings of Rikers and what it is like within the walls. Factors such as weather conditions, solitary and its effects on mental and physical health, mistreatment, pollution and other environmental aspects, internal dangers and abuse are some of the things discussed and revealed within this article. These overall main points are supported through facts and figures, as well as first hand testimony from those that have spent time at Rikers, recounting their stay there and the conditions in which they lived in. 

The article utilizes first hand testimony from those living in new Orleans that lived through the disaster and were evacuated, documenting their hardships faced. The article also cited different government agencies as well as different papers and organizations for statistics on post disaster government funding, emergency response and preparedness.

"Health care service delivery may be challenging in the post-disaster environment and often requires coordination and cooperation among levels of government, health services programs, schools, media, and community organizations  "

"The first challenge lies in identifying the correct sampling frame, which generally comprises all persons affected by the disaster. The sampling frame may be even more difficult to identify in natural disasters, when the geographic area of impact is larger and less defined."

"The second challenge lies in finding potential participants and completing interviews. Widespread displacement and communication breakdown may make it difficult to reach per- sons who have experienced the disaster, and if they can be reached, they may be consumed with recovery efforts and may not agree to participate in research .  "

"Psychological first aid (PFA) has become the preferred post-disaster intervention, with three goals: Secure survivors’ safety and basic necessities (e.g., food, medical supplies, shelter), which promotes adaptive coping and problem solving; reduce acute stress by addressing post-disaster stressors and providing strategies that may limit stress reactions; and help victims obtain additional resources that may help them cope and regain feelings of control.  "

Since the report was published by the IAEA, which is an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical cooperation of nuclear technology worldwide, it can be considered a government report. 

Reading this article caused me to do a further, in depth research on Fukushima and what actions led to what happened as well as what transpired during and after the disaster. I also looked into what the emergency response standards are today which led me to look at the IEAE website. I also looked at some of the author's other works that she wrote as well as explored and researched the WANO site. I read into their operating experiences and read about their pledge to "Prevent events by learning from others." I found out they have implemented "significant operating experience reports" as well as "significant event reports" and numerous other safe guards.