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Andreas_Rebmann

They use aggregated interviews wherein all or many of the survivors repeat the same issues with long term effects of the disaster.

They also study the socioeconomic longterm effects of the disaster by comparing New Orleans years later to the past, showing how permanent an effect the storm had despite eventual recovery.

They also used sociological surveys that showed widespread mental health disorders that developed throughout the survivor population in greater frequency than that of the normal population due to the events that occured.

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wolmad

This arguement is supported by looking at 4 specific case histories and examining the factors contributing to the investigations in each.

1. The 1814 Burning of the Capitol Building - Investigation of the disaster conducted by one engineer, B.H. Lathobe, who was given vast resources with very few obsticles, except for financial constraits and an impatient congress, to complete his investigation and reconstruct the building. 

2. 1850 Hauge St. Explosion - After a major boiler explosion in Manhattan's Lower East Side, a pannel of "jurrors" and "experts" were called together to complete investigations, bring forth the history of the fauty boiler, and place the blame for the accident in an effort to "memorialize the dead and bring them justice." Because of the way this investigation was conducted, the blame could not be accurately placed so everyone involved was blamed for the failure.

3. 1903 Iroquois Theater Fire - John Ripley Freeman, a fireproof engineering expert and factory inspector, was brought in to complete a report and provided one of the first "modern" scientific disaster investigations. He utilized a new network of investigators, engineers, insurance companies, testing labs, and inter-industry coordination that characterizes modern disaster investigation. 

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Andreas_Rebmann

"This realization (of having to face Nuclear disasters) marks a major shift in our thinking about nuclear risk, away from accident prevention, and toward accident mitigation and more rigorous emergency preparedness."

"Severe nuclear accidents may thus require international instiutions to coordinate their mitigation."

"...the 'culture of control' (that is, attempts to regulate every last action of the operating staff) is too rigid to account for all imaginable situations... it would appear to be in the interest of voerall nuclear safety to log and learn from these incidents, rather than conceal them."