COVID-19 as Disaster
Photo essay curating insights from critical disaster studies for the transnational disaster STS COVID-19 project.
Photo essay curating insights from critical disaster studies for the transnational disaster STS COVID-19 project.
Digital collection supporting a Transnational Disaster STS COVID-19 Collaboration Call, Thursday, July 9, 2020.
Roberto:
Perhaps this piece by Paul Farmer et al. on the compounding of the cholera epidemic and earthquake in Haiti gives us some food for thought? Thinking about transnational STS and critical disaster studies, it may be worthwhile to discuss how COVID is compounded in places that are still recovering from or experiencing other kinds of disasters.
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3104956/Vivian: I have been interested (not surprisingly) of how the pandemic has been framed, in particular, as a war, an "invisible enemy," something that requires some external or bio-technical solution or shifts blame -- in disasters, of course, we know this happens (e.g., framing disasters as merely "natural" ). Celia Lowe's article on the pandemic that never quite was (H5N1) I like -- asking questions like for whom is biosecurity? And illustrating how geopolitics plays in anticipatory pandemic responses. I have attached that piece. There is another piece that I have been interested in: The State, Sewers, and Security: How Does the Egyptian State Reframe Environmental Disasters as Terrorist Threats? by Mohameed Rafi Arafin, in AAAG.https://doi.org/10.1080/24694452.2018.1497474. The other aspect I have been trying to think through, which maybe already came up in the anti-blackness/rebellious mourning call: I have been thinking a lot about how George Floyd tested positive for COVID-19, how this is a compounded disaster: antiblackness, institutionalized racism, and the pandemic. I don't think that anyone would argue against the notion that the pandemic is a disaster, but what about it is disaster? I like thinking about disaster as capaciously as possible. I have started reading Christina Sharpe's "In the Wake," in which she talks about slavery, black subjection, colonialism, terror as disaster. Perhaps this would be a timely piece of work to add to disaster literature? The first chapter is available on Duke UP's website: https://www.dukeupress.edu/Assets/PubMaterials/978-0-8223-6294-4_601.pdfRoberto:I think another piece that might go well with this group of readings is Lakoff and Collier's "Vital Systems Security." I am pasting a link to it below. Andrew Lakoff also did a talk for the Italian Society for Applied Anthropology on the pandemic recently. The talk is up on Youtube. I am also pasting a link to it.https://www.researchgate.net/publication/273911201_Vital_Systems_Security_Reflexive_Biopolitics_and_the_Government_of_Emergencyhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zhkublz7vJw&fbclid=IwAR2k9x_oNu9YR_YDuI98oSzn5w7PoTjPa0JMI7MBkuwKxYJarSCXD7MMvewAlso, I have recently co-authored a piece that will come out in Human Organization about disaster anthropology and COVID 19. The contributors to that article included Virginia Garcia Acosta and AJ Faas. Although the piece is not available for circulation yet, here are some questions that came up during the drafting of the article:Roberto:
Also, just thinking about the general historicity of the branch of disaster anthropology I was trained in (which we could say is the Susanna Hoffman and Anthony Oliver-Smith branch of the field that is heavily invested in political ecology and vulnerability theory), a lot of folks see O'Keefe et al's 1976 article as foundational. What is interesting here is that these critical geographers used a comparative approach at the level of the nation as the ground for making their core argument. So there may be some room for discussion there in terms of the Disasters STS group wanting to transcend national level data. Here's the citation for that article: O’Keefe P,Westgate K,Wisner B. 1976. Taking the naturalness out of natural disasters. Nature 260:566–67Oliver-Smith, who is credited with bringing political ecology and disaster anthropology into conversation also credits the work of a Latin American and British network of geographers, anthropologists, historians, and sociologists called La Red with creating the formulation of Marxist analysis that became foundational of the vulnerability shcool of thought. Andrew Maskrey and a group of Latin American researchers including Virginia Garcia Acosta, Gustavo Wilches Chaux, and Jesus Manuel Macias, among others collaborated on this volume, which precedes Oliver-Smith's and Hoffman's The Angry Earth and deserves a good bit of the credit for what became the American flavor of political ecology disaster studies in the US: Maskrey A, ed. 1993. Los Desastres No Son Naturales. Bogot´a, Colomb.: La RED, Intermed. Technol. Dev.Vivian:
VSS and Reflexive Biopolitics goes well with Lowe's piece, because she makes the very good point that the infrastructures that Lakoff/Collier discuss that are at the core of VSS/biopolitical governance are quite different across contexts (and as she goes on to show, in Indonesia). Beck is interesting, certainly, and is part of a general group of sociologists (including Giddens, etc) that discuss risk/globalization.
Thank you, Roberto, for the history/roots of Oliver-Smith/Hoffman's work. As an aside, there is always one part of Oliver-Smith's "Theorizing Disasters" from Catastrophe and Culture that I never really understood, which is why he excluded terrorist attacks and war from his pretty inclusive list of disasters. There is no discussion or footnote or anything that I could find! And, obviously, Kim, your work on Bhopal as a transnational disaster is so helpful too.Roberto: As for your question about why war and terrorist attacks were not included in the OS branch of disaster anthropology, I've heard or read a few comments on the matter, but I can't quite recall where at the moment. The justification runs along the line that there are different "root causes" and different institutions as well as different problematics involved. For example, political conflict can result in refugee movements, which involve a different collections of agencies as well as international accords like UNHCR. Granted, we can make the case that disasters also drive transnational migration, but, if I am not mistaken, the UN Convention does not recognize them as refugees. Maybe that's changed since my refugee studies days back in the 90s. Also, disasters and pandemics are the result of human practices that enhance the socially destructive and materially destructive capacities of geophysical phenomena and viruses, while political conflict and war are seen as the result of political intentionalities. Now this is me badly paraphrasing the justifications which, I agree, may not be completely watertight. Some anthroplogists have explored the relationships between disaster and political conflict, but usually the studies focus on how disasters push a particular historical political ecology over the edge into all out conflict. Sahlins' Stone Age Economics, for example, makes a connection between cyclones, famine, and eventual political turmoil, but the latter is seen as an effect and not as an ontological coeval. Same goes for the Guatemalan Civil War after the 1976 earthquake and there's quite a few other disaster ethnogrpahies that look at social change in the aftermath of a disaster. So there is literature that connects the two but, in some brands of disaster anthropology, war and disaster remain ontologically different. I guess it would make for a good conversation as to the blindsides such a differentiation creates and whether there are useful reasons to maintain it. Something that comes to mind in this case is Mitchell's Can the Mosquito Speak, where he looks at malaria epidemics and WWII in Egypt as intimately entangled, and we could certainly say the same about war and disaster in many cases. Also, a little footnote that may not be relevant: When Oliver-Smith was at the University of Florida, he worked closely with Art Hansen, who specialized in refugee movements. Perhaps some of this differentiation is the result of an academic division of labor from those days? That might be pushing it. I do think in general, a lot of the disaster anthropologists from this branch of anthropology would defend the differentiation they make on the grounds I listed above which, again, may have faults worth discussing. Finally, it is worth noting that many disaster anthropologists do recognize the history of militarized disaster response in the US, which goes back to Collier and Lakoff's Vital Systems Security, but it seems they separate terrorism, war, and disasters because of their different "root causes."PS - I guess the issue of war, terrorist attacks, and disasters being ontologically coeval gets to the heart of what kind of anthropology we want to do. One of the issues I have with political ecology and vulenrability theory is that they remain soemwhat unreflexive about their own modern epistemological vantagepoint. So, to a great extent, these kinds of disaster anthropology begin with certain predetermined ontologies as an analytical point of departure. I guess we could think of other kinds of anthropology where ontologies are not analytically predetermined, but they constitution is explored over the course of the ethnogrpahy like Mol does in Multiple Ontologies. Someone who comes to mind is Mara Benadusi, who has an article in Economic Anthropology about oil refinery development as disaster. The case here is that, while petrochemical development may not fit certain narrowly defined ideas about what a disaster is, what matters is that her interlocutors mobilize disaster discourse to speak about its toxic effects.Vivian:Yes, I like thinking of the disaster as being multiple (pace Mol). In my own research in Sri Lanka, the government has, with the UN funding, developed their Disaster Management Act in 2005, following the Indian Ocean tsunami. Specifically, the Act and much of the work undertaken by the post-tsunami established Disaster Management Centre focused on mainstreaming of "Disaster Risk Reduction" (preparedness rather than response -- this is also the management orientation that Lakoff/Collier discuss in the context of the US). In Sri Lanka, everything from tsunamis and earthquakes, to fires and civil strife and terrorist attackes are all consider "risks" under the purview of the Disaster Management Centre. The former Minister of Disaster Management would regularly refer to Sri Lanka's decades-long civil war as a "human-made" disaster, when speaking about mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction in the country. In light of my own experience, I always struggled with OS's exclusion of terrorist attacks and war!This article discusses the health and living inequalities faced by individuals housed in Rikers correctional facilities. It discusses that when individuals are housed there they live in subpar conditions with very little representation in legislature. The infrastructure is crumbling and residences prone to flooding. It also touches on the life lived by post-incarceration individiuals. The end tells of the hardships faced by those because it leaves them without a steady home, very little financial assistance, and a sense of self destruction.
This past spring break (2016), on a Monday night while at home, I responded to a motor vehicle accident as a Good Samaritan. The accident happened at approximately 19:00 hours on my street in Blackstone, Massachusetts. My father was on our front porch when he heard a car barreling down our back country road which has a long straight away before taking a sharp turn. Before the impact he knew that the driver would not anticipate the curve fast enough at the speed he was traveling. Sure enough, there was a loud bang and the sound of a car rolling over, which I could hear from inside the house (approximately ¼ mile from crash).
I grabbed both of my personal first aid kits and a flashlight while my father called emergency services. I walked to scene with my father and younger brother. I sped walked and arrived at the crash site first.
The vehicle was a ‘90s sedan that went straight into a telephone pole, which broke like a toothpick, and rebounded backwards and flipped 90 degrees on its left side. Parts of the car, tools, and glass were on ground, airbags deployed. There was a car seat in back, and for a moment I thought a child but it was just clothing. Front right tire was up inside front passenger compartment. Hazards flashing. Driver window was rolled down. No people in the car.
My brother and father directed traffic on either end of the crash site. They almost certainly prevented at another crash by a car who didn’t see the accident but saw my brother flag them down with his light.
I saw man standing 20’ from crash site, talking to people in a gold SUV. When I arrived I start asking medical questions and the people in the SUV leave – they were by standards who pulled up but left after I started taking over. The man in question appeared to be a lower/middle class white/Hispanic, male in his 30s. He was driving an older car with lots of tools in the back which were now all over the road. Our neighborhood is a small country community and I know he was not from our neighborhood. I assumed he was some kind of mechanic, bases on tools in car. He was wearing dirty jeans and stained hoodie. He was definitely a blue-collar worker. He may have been from downtown Blackstone which is largely lower middle class and blue collar, or he may have been from Woonsocket, Rhode Island, which is known as “the Detroit of Rhode Island”.
As I tried to obtain basic medical information from the patient, it was apparent he had an altered mental status, and did not appear to understand fully what was going on. I am not certain if it was alcohol and/or drugs as for safety reasons I did not get close enough to the patient/suspect to tell. He was ambulatory and verbal. The interesting part of our conversation was to the best of my ability as follows:
“Are you sure you’re okay? Umm yeah. Are you hurt anywhere? I’m fine. [I did visual inspection of patient using flashlight which revealed no major injuries other than minor cuts from airbag]. [He starts to edge away from scene]. You should wait for ems to check you out. Wait, you’re right! I might die?! You appear to be okay externally but things like internal bleeding, and a full assessment could reveal other problems. Naaaa [turns and starts to walk away down street]”
I attempted to convince the patient to wait on scene but he was going through several mode swings during my interactions with him from fear, anxiety, agitation, and anger. While I was talking to the patient, the first officer from the neighboring town arrived on a motor cycle. I informed the officer at the scene of the situation about the patient/suspect fleeing the scene. The officer took note of it and continued to work to secure the crash site. Another officer arrive from my town from the west. I informed the same and he stated that he would need me to make a witness statement and proceeded to the crash site. A third and fourth officer arrived together the same time as two ambulances (indicated because of rollover) from the east. One of them told me again that they would need a witness statement.
I met back up with my dad and brother who were no longer needed to control traffic with law enforcement on scene. Neighbors had started coming out to see the commotion. We were all talking near the scene while waiting for officers. Finally one of the officers asked another officer if he should go look for the suspect. He left approximately 20 minutes after my last contact. I never spoke with the arriving EMS as they came from the east and I was on the west of the accident but officers told them that the patient was missing. Eventually multiple officers and cars were out looking for patient/suspect but was not found as far as I am aware. I finally was given the chance to give my testimony which, to the best of my knowledge, mirrors this report. After reading out loud in front of the officer and my father and brother to confirm accuracy, the officer asked me something very strange. First, he asked me to add what the suspect was wearing (which I had forget to include), but then he also asked me to state that I saw the suspect drive into the telephone pole and that I smelled alcohol on the patients breath. Neither of these things were what I told any of the officers and ran counter to my testimony as written. I include the suspect’s clothing description but I did not add the second mention and stated that I had not witnessed those things. After my report I left the scene with my brother and father.
Some of the policies and procedures relevant to this case were: scene safety, dealing with aggressive/combative patients, and HIPPA did not apply to me as a bystander so I gave full testimony including medical status to the officers.
After reflecting on the education I received and didn't receive, there are a few things that would have allowed me to be better prepared for this incident. How do I convince patients to stay on scene? When do you give up? I wish my EMT class was a little better scene on safety training. Being distracted by the emergency at hand, I did not truly take into account the fact that the power lines were live and drooping with half of the telephone poll pulling on them. Only supported by the next and previous poll but not drooping more than 3’ from normal, more than 15’ from ground, and 10’ above vehicle. Reflecting on it, I did not really consider the threat as I should have, and neither did the officers on scene. I don’t understand why it took so long for police to search for the suspect who could have had major medical issues. Should I have followed suspect/patient alone? When is a citizen arrest allowed/appropriate? Should I have asked for the badge number of the officer who asked me to misrepresent the truth on an eye witness testimony? What is the process to do that anyway? If I had the answers to these questions I feel I may have been able to provide better assistance, but then again perhaps not.
Katrina, being that astronomical disaster that it was, has a response factor on a whole new level. The article touches on the response both immediately after and in a longer term context. It touches upon the aid provided by relief agencies throughout and the difficulties faced by those organizations due to scarcity and over demand of recourses.
Actors reffered to:
Firefights:
Thomas Von Essen was the city's fire commissioner.
Battalion Chief Joseph Pfeifer was the first fire chief to begin operations on 9/11. He sent companies into the towers but found he was unable to properly communicate with them.
Deputy Assistant Chief Albert J. Turi was one of the firefighters in the towers that day who was unable to send and receive communications.
Assistant Chief Joseph Callan was in the north tower and ordered an evacuation order after felling the floor shifting. His order was largely unheard.
Assistant Chief Donald J. Burns was at both the 1993 bombings as well as the 9/11 attacks on the towers. On 9/11 he died leading operations in tower 2.
Mr. Modica, a firefighter, could not reach a friend who was a few floors above him with his radio equipment over any of the channels.
Mr. Campagna, a Firefighter, remembers getting out just before his tower fell.
Police:
Police Commissioner (at time of article’s writting) Kelly stated that there was no link between the various first response agencies on the day.
Bernard B. Kerik was the police commissioner on the day of the attack. He claimed that he was unaware of any communication issues during the incident.
Sergeant Moscola was a police officer.
Government:
Rudolph W. Giuliani was the mayor of NYC.
Richard J. Sheirer was the former director of the city's Office of Emergency Management and a fire dispatcher when speaking of the first responder’s communication equipment he said: “We're dinosaurs”.
Naval War College helped do and self-examination of the fire department’s command and control after the disaster.
James Ellson was a former deputy in the city's Office of Emergency Management
Civilians:
Ms. Frederick was a civilian who barely got clear of the towers in time. She credits a firefighter for saving her life saying: “He stayed there because there were more people behind us''.
David Rosensweig was the president of the fire alarm dispatchers' union.
Sharon Premoli was an executive vice president of Beast Financial Systems.
“The legacy of Chernobyl has been used as a means of signaling Ukraine's domestic and international legitimacy and staking territorial claims; and as a venue of governance and state building, social welfare, and corruption.”
"Citizens, have come to depend on obtainable technologies and legal procedures to gain political regongition and admission to some form of welfare inclusion."
"She told me that Ukrainians were inflating their numbers of exposed persons, that their so-called invalids "didn't want cover." She saw the illnesses of this group as a "struggle for power and mater sources related to the disaster."
This article relates to public health as the conditions of the island prison are a health concern of themselves and other conditions exacerbate existing health issues of inmates there. It also addresses the issues with healthcare, housing, and financial stability after release from the system.