The article cites the merits and failures of the investigations following three disasters. These are the burning of the Capitol Building in 1814, a boiler explosion in 1850, and the Iroquois Theater Fire of 1903.
The author cites a number of cases in which the law proved difficult to enforce. One example is seen when looking at the difference in residency application acceptance rates between different locales/prefects. The much larger and metropolitan areas would accept down to 47% of the applications, indicating a possibly fair division of candidates reviewed. Other more rural areas would accept over 90% of the applications, showing almost no distiguishment between ailments. The question becomes whether this is reflective on the doctors' judgements of "serious ailment" given location, the political beliefs of the prefect, or simply the lack of caring whether someone emmigrates or not. Another example of the flaws in this law is highlighted by a personal anecdote from a patient. The patient was given a diagnosis when originially coming to France on a personal visa. They were told their condition was quite serious and would require ongoing care. However, when the doctor who diagnosed him was asked to sign for evaluation for the residency permit, the doctor changed his diagnosis to something much less serious. The political thought behind the poicy came into play and interrupted the normal proceedings, tearing doctors between their obligations to the law (and only allow exceptional cases) and to medicine (and err on the side of caution).
The author also highlights the development of this law and its effects in three stages. Pre-1990: Serious illness was a factor in residency completely at the discretion of local government. Immigrants were seen as workers and they served that purpose only. If a worker was sick, they were of no use to society. 1990-1998: Illness was more often factored into the decision making process, but those allowed to stay received no paid employment or social wellfare benefits. Post 1998: Written into law, ill immigrants were allowed to stay with the opportunity for pay and legal status in France.
Emily Goldmann is an Assistant Research Professor at NYU in the College of Global Public Health. Her research primarily focuses on the social and environmental factors affecting mental health. She has written several articles on the mental health conditions in soldiers, which can sometimes be extended to emergency responders in disaster zones.
Sandro Galea is a professor and dean at Bostom University and former Chair of Epidemiology at Columbia University. He formerly was an emergency physician and served with MSF. His research primarily focuses on the causes of mood and anxiety disorders in realtion to urban populations. He also talks on inequality in health care and the consequences of traumatic events on specific populations.
That is a very good question, I have seen reviews of it, but never about it actually being used for the intended purpose. Thats not surprising given the subject content. As a college student, I personally would be offended and more or less turned off if my partner decided to pull out their phone and record consent on it while we were going for it. Thats probably why its hard to find any good reviews...
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The program is divided into three sub-programs: Radiation Disaster Medicine, Radioactivity Environmental Protection, and Radioactivity Social Recovery. The Radiation Disaster Medicine course is a four year PhD program, for those who already have professional degrees (medicine, pharmacy, dentistry, etc.) and master’s degrees (medical physics). The Radioactivity Environmental Protection course is a five year program for students who have completed a bachelors or masters in a related field. The Radioactivity Social Recovery course is a five year program for students with a bachelors or master’s. The curriculum is broken down into common subjects, specialized subjects, fieldwork, and internships.
“More than 20 years ago, social scientists Harry Otway and Brian Wayne cautioned that accident prevention (safer designs, better operator training, etc. , but even more so emergency planning, faced significant economic and managerial hurdles.”(p199)
“Nuclear accidents have tended to trigger organizational reform with regard to nuclear emergency response, but not on an international level. In considering this problematic ground, where might we start to develop a global approach to nuclear disaster mitigation?”(p200)
“The specific kinds of highly specialized knowledge involved with operation nuclear reactors however may not be accessible to broad public debate to the same degree as, for example, evacuation policies. But in the interest of sustainable, socially legitimate solutions, arguably decisions about even the technical responses to disasters should not be left to scientists and engineers alone, whether they are based within the nuclear industry, a regulatory bod, or a nongovernmental organization.”(p196)
“For all its undeniable flaws, the nuclear industry worked for several decades- in Japan and elsewhere. That is also the truly frightening realization after Fukushima: this disaster was not ‘waiting to happen’, but occurred in a system that had been functioning reasonable well for quite some time.”(p198)
“…The Way Forward is embedded in a technocratic rationality that seeks an effective ‘technical fix’ for reducing the risk of a nuclear disaster to manageable proportions. That misses the less tangible social expertise and improvisational skills inevitable involved in any successful disaster response.” (p206)
The American Red Cross uses the gold-standard products for most of its research and service. For disaster response, the ARC utilizes the good-will of its volunteers to address needs such as shelter, food, and health services. On the local level, chapters of the ARC have disaster action teams that respond to smaller emergencies and provide transition services to the victims of such emergencies. They also have a larger wokforce of volunteers to pull from and use for support services.
The authors are Stephen Collier, PhD and Andrew Lakoff, PhD. Dr, Collier is an associate professor of international affairs at UC Berkeley. He is an anthropologist by training, and focuses his research on a variety of political schools of thought and their applications. Dr, Lakoff is an associate professor of sociology and focuses his research globalization, biomedical innovation and the history of human sciences.
The stakeholders in the film would be the doctors, the local health ministry, and the patients themselves. The doctors were the most focused on, and they were put into a lot of situations in which they were the sole decision makers. However, many times the decisions weren't life or death, but death or comfort. For instance, Davinder was in a situation where a child was inexplicably swelling all over his body. The doctors weren't well equipped for diagnosing his illness, and thus the child was doomed to worsen and die. A nurse informed him that the mother had taken the child and left, to which Davinder remarked that he couldn't blame them. He believed the comfort of the child in somewhere without his care was worth just as much as, if not more than, his care in the hospital. This was quite different than Kiara's opinion that they needed to stay in the hospital. She blamed it on a lack of confidence in medical ability, while he saw it as being human.
Following the time on the mission, the doctors all had to decide what was next. Dr. Brasher left MSF to practice medicine in Paris, while Dr. Gill went to Australia to become a pediatrician, with no plans of returning to MSF. Dr. Lapora was promoted to Emergency Coordinator, and established three more missions in other parts of the world. Dr. Krueger still works with MSF and has been on a number of other missions. All of the doctors continued medicine, but their experiences in Liberia dictated their plans on whether to continue this service.