Skip to main content

Search

pece_annotation_1475447818

ciera.williams

The author cites a number of cases in which the law proved difficult to enforce. One example is seen when looking at the difference in residency application acceptance rates between different locales/prefects. The much larger and metropolitan areas would accept down to 47% of the applications, indicating a possibly fair division of candidates reviewed. Other more rural areas would accept over 90% of the applications, showing almost no distiguishment between ailments. The question becomes whether this is reflective on the doctors' judgements of "serious ailment" given location, the political beliefs of the prefect, or simply the lack of caring whether someone emmigrates or not. Another example of the flaws in this law is highlighted by a personal anecdote from a patient. The patient was given a diagnosis when originially coming to France on a personal visa. They were told their condition was quite serious and would require ongoing care. However, when the doctor who diagnosed him was asked to sign for evaluation for the residency permit, the doctor changed his diagnosis to something much less serious. The political thought behind the poicy came into play and interrupted the normal proceedings, tearing doctors between their obligations to the law (and only allow exceptional cases) and to medicine (and err on the side of caution).  

The author also highlights the development of this law and its effects in three stages. Pre-1990: Serious illness was a factor in residency completely at the discretion of local government. Immigrants were seen as workers and they served that purpose only. If a worker was sick, they were of no use to society. 1990-1998: Illness was more often factored into the decision making process, but those allowed to stay received no paid employment or social wellfare benefits. Post 1998: Written into law, ill immigrants were allowed to stay with the opportunity for pay and legal status in France. 

pece_annotation_1480365002

ciera.williams

The app was actually designed originally as an experiement by the Institute for the Study of Coherence and Emergence. The members of their Affirmative Consent Division were given the app as an experiment on the context of discussion around cosent. The idea was to test how discussion about consent affects the consent itself and the acts following. The Institute page doesn't really say where the funding is from, though I'd say privately through members and sponsors.

pece_annotation_1473044161

ciera.williams

The shift in thought from prevention to response is well supported as a necessary move. This can obviously be seen by the occurrence of these accidents despite adequate regulation. Nuclear energy is a promising, but dangerous thing, and can quickly become disastrous despite efforts to maintain control. This was seen in the accident at Fukushima, following the earthquake and resulting tsunami in the region. Despite preparation for such an event and the existence of backup generators and batteries, responders were rendered useless in the efforts as they could not access the area. This is where the need for a prepared system of nuclear response is needed. Historically, such emergency response groups have been poorly resourced and short-lived, such as the Soviet Spetsatom developed after the Chernobyl disaster in 1986. This group, which focused on preserving lessons learned and developing response systems, was absorbed by a larger ministry with the goal of integrated disaster response.

Additionally, the author cites a number of factors that played a role in creating the Fukushima-Daiichi disaster, such as “environmental, social, and technical systems” that, due to their complexity and separate protocol, resulted in lack or preparedness for the disaster. Following the disaster, the response efforts were delayed by this lack of preparation, and the media called out TEPCO and the Japanese government for this. STS analysis is important in this aftermath as much as in the creation of the initial plan. By utilizing an interdisciplinary approach, the media (and the people) can be heard and used to reform existing policies, or create new ones. This establishes a continuously evolving system of response that can adapt and take into account many different view of disaster relief.