Search

I am interested in the Macro scale and the macro effects evident at a city-scale level. I remember visiting New Orleans in 2016 and vividly remember seeing several signs with a large 'No' symbol drawn and the text  "neighbors not tourists" printed on the sign. Recently, as part of my research into New Orleans, I stumbled on this piece by the Guardian on how short-term rentals through platforms such as Airbnb are leading to gentrification in New Orleans. Highlighted in the article is how several Airbnb hosts do not reside on the listed premises. I remember the place we stayed, as we were a large party, having a 617 prefix number.  The prefix stood out as I knew the code 617 represented Boston and was curious what someone with ties to Boston doing in New Orleans as a host. In a similar vein, the article also highlights the problem of absentee hosts, hosts who acquire property for the sole purpose of setting up the property as an Airbnb site.

To tackle the problem, one councilwoman passed a law that required any Airbnb hosts in residential zones to have a homestead exemption verifying they live on site. In this case, a city-wide measure was taken and passed into law affecting the micro. It is common to have one host having several properties in different residential areas in New Orleans. From a technical standpoint, it could be viewed that Airbnb as technology is developed and presented as a scalable product. With no limits to reproducibility. Meanwhile, real-life discontinuities exist in the form of such homestead laws. It is impossible to live in more than one homestead at the same time. In other words, the concept of the human is not scalable.
Likewise, neither is cultural heritage. The city of New Orleans positions its self as a city with great cultural heritage. It is through this heritage that they seek to draw more and more tourists. How do cities think of scaling up successful initiatives and how do they navigate the political, social, ecological, or economic entanglements. At what point is downscaling necessary? Is culture scalable?

[1]https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/mar/13/new-orleans-airbnb-trem…

I am currently a Ph.D. student interested in exploring the entanglements of scale, especially in the context of environmental sensing.  My primary research seeks to engage in discourse around the value of scalability that is presented as inherent in computation. While the term scale-up is almost synonymous with computation, sustainability; on the other hand, is known as a problem of scale. Take for example, the discourse on climate change where the actions required to combat climate change requires interventions at different scales. In this context, demanding changes at individual scales while no corresponding changes happen at larger scales would not yield much.

In looking at New Orleans, I came across a video on IoT cameras developed by Cisco, the networking giant. What struck me other than the apparent rise of surveillance capitalism was the narrative of one of the police officers highlighted in the video. The officer mentions that it is not feasible for the city to place police officers on every corner. In the context of scale, the police officer is implying that cameras are useful as they extend the police officer's ability to surveil the city. In other words, cameras and the networks help scale up the police officer, making it possible for them to cover a larger scale than before.

One of the police officers, in the video, also mentions that New Orleans is a tourist and hospitable town. Which brings up the question at any given period, what scale of visitors can New Orleans support without stretching the city's resources? Several other cities in the world have made efforts to limit visitors, in order not stretch city resources. The recent crisis at Mount Everest is an excellent example of what happens when resources are stretched to accommodate the increasing number of local visitors. How could something of this nature similarly impact New Orleans?

At the communication center where the video feed is analyzed, the IT manager provides reasons as to why they chose Cisco as their vendor. One of the reasons he gives was that the system is easily expandable, allowing the ability to scale out/up the network.

The main argument that Sonja makes is that there does not exist any international organization with capabilities and expertise to respond to nuclear disasters. Further, with talk of forming such an organization/team since Fukushima, any international nuclear disaster strike team will need to have good relations with the communities and workers that they help as well as good communication at the international level to see the maximum effective response.

It has been cited in reports of the top polluted areas of the world. (http://www.worstpolluted.org/projects_reports/display/44)

According to Google Scholar the report was cited by 7 other papers.

In 2011 the IAEA developed the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety –a comprehensive safety plan for everything from planning a new site to response. After the Fukushima disaster, the IAEA gave a report the Fukushima Daiichi Accident, comprised of international collaboration of almost 200 experts from IAEA member states on what happened, how it happened, and what should be done moving forward. IAEA also worked with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN to use nuclear testing technologies to help Botswana quickly and effectively test for cattle disease.

I followed up on: the availability of medicine in 3rd world countries, the success of treating patients in less developed countries, and the complications of suspicion of western medicine in these areas.

The World Health Organization (WHO) has referenced this study in several places, namely on this powerpoint on natural disasters. (http://www.who.int/diseasecontrol_emergencies/publications/idhe_2009_london_natural_disasters.pdf).

Research Gate, a journal library, has an article entitled “Infectious diseases following natural disasters: Prevention and control measures” which also references this study. (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/51860057_Infectious_diseases_following_natural_disasters_Prevention_and_control_measures)

It was well received in large when it was signed into law by President Ronald Regan in 1986. The need, benefits, and issues brought about that. The only negative was the potential to cheap the system and steal from hospitals by those who are able to pay but don’t. This issue is not really a major issue because patients still get billed and there are still repercussions for not paying bills but if the need for urgent care is real it could save your life; however about 6% of hospital services are never paid for, thus not completely an unreal threat.

Several stakeholders are presented in this film. First, the families in the communities that were affected. This especially focused on Emmanuel Urey’s family who had to decide to leave some of their children behind in Liberia as they could not secure the necessary affidavits to bring them all to the US. Next, The first responders who have to deal with a public that does not trust them and does not follow health instruction. The government is the last main stakeholder presented in the film. They are trying to control the disease as well as treat those already infected which has many social issues on top of the medical issues such as starvation, water shortages, and shooting their own citizens to enforce the measures designed to protect them.

Scott Gabriel Knowles, PHD is a department head and associate professor at Drexel University in the department of history and the center for science, technology and society. Prof. Knowles specializes in the history of technology, disasters, and public policy.