1) The article begins by articulating the four domains that "biosecurity" supposedly encompasses. Yet, even just by looking at these four domains with a basic knowledge of current events, one can understand these are all far from having any sense of stability. Just recently, more reports emerged of use of chlorine gas and other agents against citizens in Syria. Reluctance to vaccination has led to a re-emergence of measles and pertussis across the US.
2) Increase awareness and attention does not always result in cooperative and cohesive actions. While there may be movement to address certain issues, this does not always encompass details of how to attack certain public concerns. One of the main examples cited in the article was a small pox scenario termed "Dark Winter". Here, officials struggled to gauge the possibility of a small pox bioterrorism attack with the cost and effect of the small pox vaccine-- which can result in death. The conflicting results of the scenario between healthcare personnel "on the ground", government officials, and the CDC's difficulty in gauging a credible threat level led to a dismissal of the program.
3) Many of the approaches by global agencies touted as medical agencies primarily center on emergency response protocols. This modality prepares them for quick, short responses to emergency problems, while neglecting long-term intervention. The article argues this approach is preferred because of the galvanizing, global responses emergencies have-- they garner attention and resources quickly, while long-term problems do not. Additionally, short-term presence is far easier to prepare for than implementing long-term solutions to medical scenarios.
